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Captain Swing in the North: the Carlisle Riots of 1830. 
By Katrina Navickas 
 
On the evening of Tuesday, 30 November 1830, incendiaries set fire to a wheat stack 
and a haystack situated in two fields a quarter of a mile outside Carlisle, Cumberland. 
Large crowds gathered at the sites of both fires and proceeded to riot. Disturbances 
continued the following day when workmen attempted to salvage what little remained 
of the stacks. Local newspapers and witnesses at the ensuing trial assumed that the 
incidents were the work of ‘Captain Swing’, the imaginary leader of the wave of 
arson and agricultural machine breaking that was concurrently raging across southern 
England. This impression of the unusual nature of the agitation was amplified when, 
some days later, the clerk of the peace and several local gentlemen received 
threatening letters signed with pseudonyms, including that of ‘Swing’. Two handloom 
weavers, James Mendham, alias Montgomery, aged twenty–six, and Robert Thursby, 
aged thirty–eight, were eventually arrested and tried for arson, and five other men 
were charged with rioting.1  
This outbreak of ‘Swing’ in Carlisle was highly significant, not least because 
the Swing riots are more usually associated with the arable flatlands of southern 
England rather than with the rugged hills and industrial ports of Cumberland. Eric 
Hobsbawm and George Rudé noted only briefly in their classic study, Captain Swing, 
that Cumberland and the other northern counties were ‘affected by rick–burning’.2 
Hobsbawm and Rudé’s opus inspired numerous studies of rural disturbances in Kent, 
Sussex, and other ‘Swing’ counties in southern England, but few north of Derbyshire. 
‘Swing Unmasked’, the innovatory project involving family and community 
historians, found over fifty incidents (broadly defined) in northern England, but these 
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have not been examined in detail.3 Superficially, therefore, the Carlisle example could 
simply be used to shift historians’ focus on Swing northwards. Northern inhabitants 
responded forcefully to political and social unrest in 1830 by creating their own 
Captain Swing. The Carlisle riots were followed a few days later by another stack fire 
at nearby Dalston; at least a dozen other major fires or disturbances occurred in 
Yorkshire between 1830 and 1834.4 However, it cannot be denied that the upsurge of 
incendiarism and agricultural machine–breaking in the early 1830s, which historians 
have conveniently condensed into the metonym of ‘Swing’, was predominantly a 
southern phenomenon. The unconnected reports of arson and threatening letters in 
northern England pale into insignificance in comparison with over three thousand 
Swing–related incidents reported in the southern counties.5 Many of the Yorkshire 
cases, moreover, were proven to be products of private grievances, often fostered by 
recently dismissed servants of the attacked.6  
So the occurrence of the Carlisle riots, while illustrating that Swing had some 
influence beyond the Trent, is not the main point of this essay. For what this study 
reveals is a need to rethink more generally the meaning and significance of Swing. 
Swing in the North complicates previous grand narratives of popular unrest in the 
1830s. The Hammonds dubbed the Swing riots broadly as the ‘last labourers’ revolt’. 
Hobsbawm and Rudé believed that the southern agitation originated in a plebeian 
reaction against severe rural distress exacerbated by capitalist landowners seeking to 
maximize profit by installing labour–saving machinery.7 Roger Wells emphasized 
political radicalism among the causes of the disturbances, while Andrew 
Charlesworth believed that the system of communications centred on London was 
crucial to the spread of the movement. All essentially framed Swing as a vehicle for 
nascent class consciousness among dispossessed agricultural labourers moulded by 
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the orations of the radical writer William Cobbett.8 Once the dust clouds generated by 
Marxism had settled in the 1980s, however, there was no ‘agricultural proletariat’ to 
be seen among the disorganized and shadowy incendiaries and machine–breakers of 
the 1830s. The search for class floundered and set back the history of Swing.  
E. P. Thompson criticized Captain Swing for viewing ‘the riots through a 
slight haze and at a great distance’. Hobsbawm and Rudé cagily acknowledged in 
their second edition that in–depth case studies could supplement (but not replace) 
their methods.9 It is only recently, however, that protest historians have begun to re–
conceptualize agricultural unrest in this period. Steve Poole, Peter Jones, Carl Griffin, 
and Adrian Randall, amongst others, have broken the hold of Hobsbawm and Rudé’s 
influential but broad–brush approach to Swing. They place ‘outbreaks of Swing into 
the context of local employment and social relations’, and seek a longer history of 
regionally–specific causes. Only then, they argue, can the complexities of the 
agitation can be understood.10 They furthermore underline the dynamic between 
social elites and local communities. Poole noted the lack of response to 
Charlesworth’s plea back in 1991 for ‘serious studies of the mounting frustration of 
magistrates, assize judges, military commanders, lord lieutenants, local landowners, 
and bewildered editors of urban newspapers over their inability to penetrate what J. E. 
Archer has called the “enormous solidarity, even covert sympathy of the majority of 
working people towards the instigators of the fires”’.11  
This essay builds on this new approach to Swing. Although the agitation in 
northern England was influenced by the idea of ‘Captain Swing’ emanating from the 
south, its causes and contexts were distinctive. The first part of this essay investigates 
how the Swing riots in Carlisle were a conflagration of a long history of social and 
political conflict in the city. In particular, it calls upon historians to pay closer 
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attention to the impact of ‘the reactive and proactive behaviour’ of magistrates, police, 
and the newspapers upon how Swing was perceived and spread. The Carlisle case also 
points to the permeable periphery between rural and urban areas: Swing was not a 
wholly agricultural phenomenon.12 
These structural factors rationalize the disturbances and place them into a 
definable socio–economic context. Yet we still have to deal with ‘Captain Swing’, the 
slippery and intangible character that distinguished the agitation of the early 1830s 
from the other waves of incendiarism that beset rural society throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The second part of this essay unpicks the myth of 
Swing. Most of the evidence of the character’s existence comes from the anonymous 
threatening letters and the shadowy figures reported in newspapers and magistrates’ 
correspondence with the Home Office. The content of Swing letters often represented 
a multiplicity of voices with myriad grievances, and thus make it impossible for 
historians seeking to attribute rational motives to events that were often only 
indirectly connected.13 Nevertheless, the idea of the mythical leader became a 
convenient framework for understanding the complexities of popular unrest in the 
early 1830s. 
This perception of Swing returns to my rethinking of the meaning of ‘General 
Ludd’, the mythical leader of the industrial machine–breakers in 1812. I argued that 
Ludd was imagined by disparate groups of workers who were militarized by the 
Napoleonic war but lacking a prominent political leader to unite them. Yet crucially, 
the authorities also fostered the myth. Ludd was a way of making sense of what was 
in many ways an intangible threat, and to cover up for the magistrates’ weakness in 
enforcing order.14 By contrast, there is little evidence that arsonists or agricultural 
machine–breakers in 1830–4 saw Captain Swing as a figurehead. The only self–
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identification came from the anonymous threatening letter writers, who cannot be 
connected directly with the rioters and arsonists. Unlike Ludd, the pseudonym of 
Swing was not a point of coherence for a ‘movement’ of agricultural labourers, and 
even less so in the isolated instances in the North. As Jones has identified in Kent, 
Swing was a product of ‘those who required an enemy on which to focus their fears 
and disapproval rather than protesters who sought a mythical ally’.15 In the early 
1830s, local authorities found it convenient to tar popular agitation with the sticky 
brush of Swing, even though it had little to do with incidents of arson down south. 
Rioters and the forces of law and order alike came to conclusions aroused by rumour 
and panic, emotions that consequently fed back into perceptions of the disturbances.  
* 
The Carlisle riots of November 1830 involved more twists and turns than a detective 
novel. Hobsbawm and Rudé gave the impression that radical politics was at the heart 
of the conflict. They very briefly described the rick–burning as ‘an act of political 
reprisal’ and noted that ‘three weavers – described as Radicals – were arrested’.16 As 
we will see, this formed only part of the story. The father of the main suspect James 
Mendham, alias Montgomery, had been imprisoned in 1802 for belonging to an illegal 
trade combination participating in political activities connected with the republican 
United Scotsmen. Montgomery was turned in by his family, who used the reward 
money to pay for his legal defence.17 The two other weavers, Daniel McCrory, aged 
22, and James Cully, aged 55, were put under an arrest warrant but escaped capture. 
In December, a magistrate suspected that Cully, ‘one of the worst characters in 
Carlisle’, had unsuccessfully attempted to ‘summon the Radicals in this 
neighbourhood to go to Carlisle to attempt to rescue a prisoner who is in the gaol’.18 It 
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was Montgomery with a Robert Thursby, however, and not McCrory and Cully who 
faced the assizes in February 1831.  
The riots in Carlisle coincided with intensified pressure for parliamentary 
reform during the autumn of 1830, so it is unsurprising that Hobsbawm and Rudé 
instinctively connected the incendiarism with political radicalism. The county capital 
and port was situated on the main routes between the textile centres of Lancashire, 
Northumberland, northern Ireland, and southern Scotland. It was well used to the 
passing through of trade union and political ‘delegates’, such as the fiery Scottish 
orator, ‘Jemmy Weems’, who led the last wave of radical agitation in 1819.19 
Revolution in France in July 1830 reinvigorated radical energies across Britain. 
Carlisle was by no means on the periphery of these developments. In September 1830, 
working–class radicals held large meetings on Carlisle Sands to draw up petitions for 
universal suffrage. A group of merchants, solicitors, and other middle–class reformers 
formed a political union with the tentative co–operation of a delegation of handloom 
weavers from among the radicals.20 On 2 November, the Duke of Wellington made a 
defiant declaration in the House of Lords against reform, provoking furious reaction 
by reformers inside and outside parliament.21 On 5 November, a handbill appeared 
calling for a public meeting at Carlisle market place. It castigated local authorities for 
opposing the radicals, proclaiming: ‘It looks as if our Magistracy wishes to load 
Reformers with the Epithet of Plunders [sic] or Robbers to sink starving people in the 
estimation of their fellow Citizens and to shed Blood’.22 Although the handbill did not 
associate itself directly with Swing, the author was clearly aware of the potency of 
posting such a notice on Guy Fawkes’ night.  
Radical agitation came to a head on 8, 9, and 10 November. London was 
concurrently convulsed by violent rioting, exacerbated by the inhabitants’ reaction 
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against the new metropolitan police.23 Radicals in Carlisle demonstrated in a highly 
ordered, though equally threatening, manner. Each night, large processions moved out 
of the working–class suburb of Caldewgate, entered the city, and paraded three times 
around the market cross in front of the town hall. On 8 November, the procession 
culminated with the burning of an effigy of Wellington, who was still holding firm 
against reform. The next night, an effigy of Sir Robert Peel, Home Secretary and 
founder of the metropolitan police, was consigned to the flames. On 10 November, a 
placard inscribed ‘Death to the Constitution’, was the subject of the same ritual.24 The 
police commission responded by holding a meeting at the end of the week to swear in 
150 special constables, ‘principally shopkeepers’, and the magistracy issued a caution 
against tumultuous behaviour. On 18 November, when news arrived of the resignation 
of Wellington’s ministry, yet another torch–lit procession marched through the main 
streets and again circled the market cross three times before returning home. These 
rituals were reputedly observed by up to six thousand inhabitants, that is, around a 
third of the population.25 The processions were neither unthinking nor spontaneous. 
They drew from a common practice of burning effigies of local and national figures 
now transposed by the radicals to the new political circumstances.26  
The rapidly changing social geography of Carlisle underpinned the tensions 
that erupted in 1830. By the early nineteenth century, economic development had 
profoundly altered what had once been an administrative and military border capital 
surrounded by farms and a port.27 The population of the city swelled from just over 
four thousand in 1763 to about nineteen thousand in 1831. Carlisle ‘within the walls’ 
was bursting to the seams with urban infilling, but the most rapid growth occurred in 
the suburbs of Caldewgate (encompassing Shaddowgate) and Botchergate, situated 
outside the walls and along the main roads into the city. Between 1788 and 1841, the 
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population of Caldewgate tripled to over five and a half thousand. Handloom weaving 
and other textile industries formed the main employment of these outlying districts. 
Mass immigration further served to change the character of the city. In 1832, of 7130 
males over the age of twenty in Carlisle, 1870 had been born in Ireland and about a 
thousand in Scotland. The majority of these immigrants settled outside the walls.28  
Carlisle was divided by class, employment, and authority. Caldewgate and 
Willow Holme, the two areas where the Swing attacks occurred, sustained a distinct 
sense of apartness from the rest of Carlisle. Although some of the city walls were 
demolished earlier in the century, the high west walls remained. These walls and the 
river Caldew separated the new industrial suburbs from the city centre above, 
particularly as they were traversable only at the north end by an old bridge named 
‘Irish Gate’. Unrest occurred in a liminal periphery that was neither solely rural nor 
completely urban. The resident Irish and Scottish communities were known as 
‘Shaddongaters’, which suggests the strong bonds among them.29 Dissent, religious or 
political, was often a feature of marginal districts of old towns.30  
Yet herein lay the twist in the tale. Neither radicals nor ordinary 
‘Shaddongaters’ incited the Swing rick–burning of 30 November 1830. What 
Hobsbawm and Rudé did not take into account was the reason why the case against 
Montgomery and Thursby was dismissed by the assize court. Witness depositions 
taken during the rioters’ trial in March 1831 revealed that the arsonists were in fact 
agents provocateurs hired by the authorities. The fires had been started at the 
instigation of one William Huntington, a petty criminal, whom the chief constable of 
police, Benjamin Batty, had employed along with another ex–convict, James Wallace, 
‘to look after’ the ‘Radical Concern’.31 Wallace had passed these duties onto 
Huntington in order to avoid detection by the populace; he explained that, ‘as it was 
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known I did a little business with him [Batty], I thought the people in Shaddowgate 
would not let me go amongst them so much as I used to do’.32 Furthermore, Batty’s 
account for paying the agents was remunerated by the mayor and town clerk rather 
than by his employers the police commissioners.33 The governing authorities of 
Carlisle therefore appear to have colluded to provoke the attacks under the convenient 
banner of Swing. It is likely that they did so in order to find an excuse to clamp down 
on the radical political activity in Caldewgate. The reformist Carlisle Journal was 
loud in its condemnation:  
 
A system of espionage is here developed as dangerous to the peace of the city 
as it is disgraceful to the police establishment […] How many more are in 
Batty’s service did not appear […] but from the whole tenor of the disclosures 
made by Wallace and Huntingdon [sic] – coupled with the hope that they 
entertained of poaching the rewards of £600 as the price of innocent blood 
they endeavoured to shed – little doubt remains in our minds but that a most 
extensive system of espionage has been carried on.34 
 
The scandal echoed previous controversies during the Luddite disturbances of 1812, 
when magistrates in Lancashire had employed ‘blackfaces’ to stoke up unrest in order 
to arrest suspected political and trade union activists. Southern Swing rioters 
blackened their faces as both disguise and to symbolize customary community 
justice.35 The ‘blackfaces’ in this case were the spies. It demonstrated how little had 
changed since the well–publicized case of ‘Oliver’ the spy that had aroused much 
indignation across the country in 1817.36  
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So the arsonists were not the agents of Swing. Although it is hard to discount 
radicals being involved in the riots that followed, neither can it be proved that the 
incendiarism was part of a concerted radical conspiracy.37 On the contrary, it is 
possible that the agents provocateurs fired the stack at Willow Holme belonging to 
the spirit merchant John Andrew because he was warm to reform. The following year 
Andrew granted permission for the radicals to hold a meeting on his property, even 
though such assemblies had been prohibited by the mayor.38 Indeed, radical 
individuals appear to have attempted to help rather than hinder the owners of the 
stacks. The bookseller James Arthur, soon to become prominent as a Chartist leader, 
made his first public appearance attempting to put out Scottish farmer James 
McCutcheon’s burning stack at Caldewgate. His ladder was ‘pulled down and thrust 
into the flames’ by the rioters.39  
Chief constable Batty’s plan backfired, however. Either out of over–eagerness 
to arrest the radicals, or from naïve assumptions about the loyalty of Carlisle 
inhabitants, the authorities seem not to have expected the exuberant reaction of the 
spectators. Indeed, the actions of the majority of the Caldewgate inhabitants were 
more significant than the fires themselves: the crowds were wildly enthusiastic, and 
prevented the authorities from putting out the blaze. Not only this, they took great 
pains to destroy the machinery of the fire engines. The Carlisle Journal reported: 
 
The feeling exhibited by a considerable portion of the crowd was certainly that 
of exultation, and they not only refused to assist in extinguishing the flames, 
but were active in preventing others from assisting. The buckets were taken 
from those carrying water and tossed into the flames, amidst considerable 
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cheering; the pipes of the fire–engines were cut in six pieces, and a police 
officer […] was knocked down by a stone.40 
 
Benjamin Batty made a vivid deposition to the assizes about his ordeal at the 
Caldewgate stack: 
 
I very soon found there was a great pressure from the Crowd upon the people 
working the Engine so as to prevent them working and I was standing between 
the Pipe and the burning Stack and the pipe was pressed towards me so as to 
push me towards the fire. I repeatedly admonished the people to keep back 
until I perceived that it was evidently intentional for the purpose of preventing 
the engine from working and when the people saw that the engine was stopped 
and that I was overpowered they repeatedly cheered. 
 
Upon finding that the pipe had been cut, Batty was met with ‘a more vehement 
cheering from the crowd than before and a more violent pressure was made against 
me towards the fire’.41 The rioters were less concerned with the owners of the stacks 
therefore than with the chief constable. Batty escaped, mustered military 
reinforcements, and eventually rescued the ruined engine. Although no more stacks 
were fired, the anger of the Caldewgate inhabitants revived the next day, and they 
drove off the workmen removing what was salvageable from the stacks.42 Rumours of 
continuing disorder were spread by the national newspapers. The police 
commissioners felt obliged to issue a poster to counteract the ‘most erroneous 
impression throughout the Country that the people of Carlisle and its suburbs are in a 
state bordering on Insurrection’.43  
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The rioters therefore misconstrued the aims of the authorities, but their actions 
cannot easily be categorized. Of course, enthusiasm for the fire may have been fuelled 
by drink and the spectacle of the event. The five people arrested for rioting were men 
aged between fifteen and twenty, and we cannot discount adolescent exuberance 
among factors inciting them to violence.44 Nevertheless, the reaction of the crowd 
paralleled general cases of arson in East Anglia in the 1830s and 1840s. J. E. Archer 
noted the importance of ‘the enormous solidarity, and even overt sympathy, of the 
majority of the working people towards the instigators of the fires’. He attributed this 
sympathy to the moral economy, an expression of community justice against a 
landowner or local notable who had transgressed unwritten social laws. Arson ‘gave 
labouring communities the opportunity to transform an act of covert protest into a 
collective and overt display of hatred against farmers’.45 Other areas experienced 
similar responses, but for different reasons. Peter Jones equated Swing attacks in Kent 
to community enforcement of the moral economy against increasingly tight–fisted 
poor law authorities.46  
In Carlisle, various social and economic grievances were aired during the 
disturbances. The Carlisle Journal reported that the phrase ‘This will teach them to 
make Corn laws’ was heard from one part of the Swing crowd.47 Although the 
veracity of this allegation cannot be verified, Whig merchants had blamed the 
protectionist legislation for the severe economic distress that had afflicted the port in 
the late 1820s. The introduction of new powerlooms had also depressed weavers’ 
employment and provoked machine–breaking in Lancashire in 1826. During the 1826 
election, Tory candidate Sir Philip Musgrave’s support for agricultural protection 
enraged the crowd at the hustings. He was forcibly put on a loom and made to weave, 
while his supporters and members of the Corporation were ducked in the mill dam. 
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Relations between local inhabitants and the governing elites were soured further when 
three people were killed after the military fired over the heads of the crowds in 
Caldewgate.48 
The Swing riots were in fact a conflagration of a running debate about 
policing and authority in the city. It is clear that the crowd had one primary target on 
30 November 1830: the police commission. Historians are familiar with the formation 
of the metropolitan police in 1829, and the forces created following the Swing riots 
and Chartist agitation, especially after the 1839 Rural Police Act. Robert Storch has 
charted the severe popular resistance to the new police across the industrial districts of 
northern England in the 1840s.49 Yet before 1829, local elites had already sought to 
solve the problem of keeping order in expanding urban areas. In 1823, manufacturers 
and professionals in Carlisle, led by a solicitor named Henry Pearson, set up their own 
police office in defiance of the Tory Corporation. The two sides jostled over an 
application for a new police bill.50 Rivalry between the old elites and the merchants 
and manufacturers framed the prolonged conflict, a situation that troubled other 
industrializing towns before the Whigs increased their dominance over local 
government in the 1830s.51 The debate over policing also reflected wider opposition to 
the Lowthers, lords Lonsdale, the leading Tory magnates in Cumberland. Sir William 
Lowther was busy developing his economic interests in the port of Whitehaven, but 
he retained a strong hand in the Carlisle district as lord lieutenant, and as patron of the 
Corporation, one of the borough’s MPs, and the Patriot newspaper.52  
The anti–Corporation faction eventually succeeded in having themselves 
elected as police commissioners in 1827. They appointed eighteen constables headed 
by Batty. The 1827 Carlisle police act was an attempt on the part of the middle classes 
to defend their property and to enforce order in the expanding city, but essentially 
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they failed. Batty was brought in to circumvent local influence, but his outsider status 
marked him out as a target for disgruntled local inhabitants. The funding of the police 
commission continued to be a bugbear in the relations between the Whig middle 
classes and the Corporation.53 Relations were soured further when some of the Whigs 
formed the political union campaigning for reform in 1830. Pearson, together with 
Peter and John Dixon, major employers of handloom weavers in Caldewgate, were 
prominent among the political union.54 The new police were deemed to be as 
ineffective as parish constables because both were assumed to share the sympathies of 
the crowd. A corporation official reported to Lord Lowther about the problems of 
keeping order during the week after the Swing riots. He attributed the disturbed 
situation to the infirmity of the two city magistrates, and the ‘utter inefficiency of our 
police – fifty men of various opinions and some of them revolutionary’.55 It is 
difficult to ascertain whether this was the case. The comment nevertheless reflected a 
sustained fear among the Tories about ‘Jacobinical police’ and their Whig 
supporters.56 The Tory Corporation may have funded the agents of Swing to avenge 
themselves against the Whigs, but it may also be likely that the moderate reformers 
condoned the set–up in attempt to distance themselves from the radical working 
classes with whom they had previously allied. 
Yet again the distinctive social geography of the city shaped the turn of events. 
It is no co–incidence that the Swing rioters singled out chief constable Benjamin 
Batty for attack. Significantly, Batty came from Manchester and had served as a 
deputy to Joseph Nadin. The latter was notorious for his involvement with ‘Oliver’ 
the spy in 1817, and for his part in the ‘Peterloo Massacre’, when local elites ordered 
the yeomanry to suppress a peaceful reform meeting in Manchester in 1819.57 Batty’s 
first venture into Caldewgate upon his appointment in 1827 had already demonstrated 
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the helplessness of a civilian force in the suburb and his role as a figurehead (and 
scapegoat) for authority. After dividing the rest of the city into police districts, he 
attempted to do the same over the river. However, ‘Mr Batty and the officers under 
him, met with serious resistance from the Irish, Scotch and other weavers in 
Shaddongate when making their first survey of that part of the suburbs; when the then 
turbulent inhabitants, unused to the interference of an effective police, became so 
outrageous that it was necessary to call in the aid of the military’.58 One of the 
suspected ‘ringleaders’ arrested for the attack on Batty in 1827 was none other than 
Daniel McCrory, the very same man whom the authorities in 1830 put under warrant 
for taking part in firing the stacks at Caldewgate.59 The Carlisle Patriot reported that 
McCrory, ‘a good looking and well dressed young man’, protested innocence, but ‘Mr 
Batty recognised him in the crowd dressed in a soldier’s jacket’.60 McCrory was one 
rioter amongst many on that night in 1830, but it is possible that Batty and the 
informants singled him out deliberately because they knew him and his previous 
opposition to them. One of the other rioters was a William Mendham, possibly a 
relation of James Montgomery or his radical father Richard. Another man arrested in 
1827 was Robert Armstrong, another Shaddongate weaver, who gave testimony for 
the defence during the Swing rioters’ trial: Huntington the informer worked in his 
son’s workshop.61  
The riots of 1830 were therefore the culmination of a build–up of social and 
political tensions among a divided population. The Carlisle elites blamed the new 
industrial communities outside the city walls, especially their immigrant inhabitants, 
for fomenting the unrest. The mayor, Thomas Lowry, reported to the Home Office 
that ‘the principal Cotton Manufacturers’ had remonstrated with their weavers about 
the disturbances and ‘they received assurances that every endeavour should be used to 
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repress the more violent among their body’. Another indication of tensions within and 
without the city was the fact that the magistrates had trouble recruiting sufficient 
numbers of special constables to put down the disturbances. Lowry had to send out 
summonses to many who refused to be sworn in, and raised the possibility of issuing 
legal proceedings against the defaulters.62 On 4 December, when the authorities had 
finally gathered 200 special constables, they defiantly headed out of the Town Hall to 
Caldewgate in order to arrest those suspected of fomenting the crowd violence and the 
senders of threatening letters. The reaction of the inhabitants was vehement: ‘Women 
assembled in different parts of the streets and heckled the special constables’.63 Batty 
presumably felt forced to retire back to Manchester, but a new chief constable took 
over in 1831.64 
Reform agitation continued to stoke up popular resentment against policing. 
During the general election of April 1831, veteran radical Jemmy Weems headed a 
meeting attended by over 3000 workers on Carlisle Sands. They resolved not to ‘hire 
themselves as bludgeon–men to assist the anti–Reformers’.65 The demonstrations 
from January to April 1831 followed the same patterns, routes, and rituals as before. 
They carried and burned an effigy of Lord Lonsdale, ‘on the breast of which was 
painted in large letters, “The Great Beelzebub of the North”’.66 Disturbances broke 
out again on 21 March 1832, the day appointed for a national fast to pray for an end to 
the cholera pandemic then sweeping across the country. The working classes regarded 
the official abstinence as representative of elite hypocrisy against their distressed 
situation. Irish and Scottish weavers repeated the ritual of parading from Caldewgate 
over the river and into the city, this time carrying placards bemoaning that food 
shortages caused cholera. An effigy of Spencer Perceval, the MP who had put forward 
the motion for the fast, was burned at the market cross. The prosecution at the 
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subsequent trial of the rioters alleged: ‘While they remained in the Market place their 
disposition towards the Police was Manifested by their attack upon a Man who had 
offended them in some way upon which there was a general cry “D – m him he is a 
Police Officer”’.67 Hostility to the police, though heightened during unrest, was a 
constant theme. Resistance to new forms of authority imposed from outside continued 
to shape the later campaigns against the new poor law of 1834 and the rural police in 
the 1840s.68  
 The Carlisle Swing riots had distinctive causes, but their socio–economic 
context was mirrored in other parts of the region. On 5 December 1830, a wheat stack 
was fired on Dalston common, five miles south–west of the city: ‘the reflection of the 
light was seen at Carlisle and excited great alarm’.69 Little other evidence about the 
incident remains, and it may have merely been a work of mimicry by a lone 
incendiarist. On the other hand, the town experienced similar patterns of immigration 
and industrialization, resulting in comparable tensions that may have manifested 
themselves through Swing and other forms of resistance. Dalston and Carlisle 
weavers and spinners co–operated in unionized activity in the late 1820s. Dalston 
radicals had burned an effigy of Wellington on 20 November 1830, and during the 
1831 election, over sixty trees were secretly maimed in plantations owned by 
prominent supporters of the Lowthers. The weaving districts of both towns went on to 
foster Chartist associations in 1838.70 
* 
This essay has so far suggested structural causes for Swing riots in Cumberland. But 
we cannot leave Carlisle without an examination of the threatening letters sent to local 
notables and accumulated by the constabulary in 1830–31. A comparable sample of 
Swing letters was collected by Henry Lascelles, second Earl of Harewood and Lord 
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Lieutenant of the West Riding of Yorkshire, and these will be examined here.71 This 
evidence of course must be treated with care. As E. P. Thompson lamented, we cannot 
be sure whether the threats were representative of genuine protest or merely ‘the voice 
of a crank’.72 Nevertheless, the letters are invaluable in explaining the myth of Swing 
and its spread. They reveal a complex narrative of rumour, panic, and imitation that 
went far beyond the immediate causes and consequences of the rick–burning. They 
made the disturbances – or how they were perceived – distinctly ‘Swing’, rather than 
being just another wave of rural incendiarism.  
The Carlisle and West Riding letters share common characteristics that 
indicate they had little to do with actual disturbances but rather developed a discourse 
of their own. Firstly, most letters were dated or received in December 1830. The 
Carlisle letters were therefore reactive to the agitation. Rather than forewarning action 
(as was usually the case with incendiarism), they were an opportunistic product of the 
heightened social and political tensions.73 Of course, these particular letters may have 
only survived because magistrates were more concerned to retain evidence after the 
disturbances; there may have been earlier letters that were discarded, although these 
were not mentioned in any trial depositions. Secondly, the early letters were signed 
not by ‘Swing’ but by more common generic pseudonyms such as ‘A. Radical’ (2 
December) and ‘A. Philanthropist’ (10 December).74 These aliases suggest that their 
writers were following a set pattern of what they expected anonymous letters to look 
like. Threatening letters had long been a feature of rural crime and unrest, and their 
generic format was printed in newspapers reports and reward notices throughout the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.75 Once the authors realized the utility of the 
myth of Swing, the format of the letters mutated. The first letter in the Carlisle 
collection to be signed ‘Swing’ was dated 4 January 1831. William Hodgson, the 
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city’s clerk of the peace, was warned by ‘Swing’ in the name of the ‘committee’ that 
‘your house and other property shall be burnt to ashes from the bad character you 
have with the people of Carlisle’. It may have aimed to tap into the wider reaction to 
authorities’ suppression of the disturbances, and the author by now knew that the 
trope of Swing would amplify the threat in a way that more generic pseudonyms 
could not. It may also have been a wider expression of discontent against the 
Lowthers: Hodgson was Lord Lonsdale’s agent in Carlisle.76 As a piece of evidence, 
the letter nevertheless remained unverifiable, especially as it was postmarked 
Nottingham.77  
What led Hobsbawm and Rudé to assume that the Carlisle riots were 
instigated by radicals were two handbills posted near the lockup in Caldewgate after 
the arrest of Montgomery in December 1830. One handbill sardonically offered: 
‘£1000 reward, in the apprehension of Borough–mongers, Stockjobbers, Tax–eaters, 
Monopolizers, Special Constables, and the Extinguishers of Freedom – by order of the 
Swing Union’.78 The other was addressed by ‘Sargin Swen’ to ‘the company’ urging 
attendance at a meeting, ‘for we are determined to release these three men that is [sic] 
in the [Caldew] gate’.79 Though the second poster may have had connections with 
Cully’s later effort to secure the prisoners’ release, the authorship of the first handbill 
is impossible to ascertain. Again, it is likely that the handbills were the work of 
radical individuals using the riots as a convenient opportunity to express their own 
political grievances. Such autonomous use of the myth of Swing was demonstrated on 
13 December at a meeting held by the Whig middle classes to discuss their petition 
for parliamentary reform. A deputation of weavers was invited to attend by the 
committee, but the Carlisle Journal alleged that one of them declared:  
 
 20 
The burnings throughout the country have had a great effect in opening the 
eyes of the landowners. It is the notorious Captain Swing who has made so 
many Reformers.80  
 
By a fortnight after the riots, ‘Swing’ had become a powerful threat and a useful 
metonym to give the impression of strength and a wider spread for individuals or 
small groups who in fact had little connection to outbreaks of arson in their district let 
alone further afield.  
Finally, most letters threatened to burn threshing machines, the harvest 
machinery that comprized the apparent vanguard of agricultural ‘improvement’ and 
capitalist endeavour. This focus was out of line with the predominant feature of 
disturbances in the north (and indeed in the southern counties), the firing of stacks. 
Only a few threshing machines were known to have been attacked in Yorkshire, and 
none in Cumberland, in this period.81 The first letter in the Carlisle collection, dated 2 
December, warned Mr Studholme, a surveyor, against retaining ‘the Corn thrashing 
machine’ that he had erected on his premises.82 In early December 1830, the Mayor of 
Doncaster received a letter signed by ‘Swing’ that ordered him as an intermediary to 
‘put down all threshing machines instantly’. A similar letter was received by a farmer 
at Rigton, near Leeds, that read: 
 
Sir, take notice that we send you word that your threshing mashine shal be 
burnt too ashishes before the month end and if you y it all Rigton wee will 
Burn it Dawn and Burn its too and so no more at present from me Mr Swing.83 
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These scraps of paper prove little apart from signalling that the myth of Swing had 
eventually taken hold as a useful trope for individuals with disparate motives, whose 
only connection with the rioting was a sense of common grievance against the local 
authorities. There is little other evidence that Swing was intended to be a co–ordinated 
campaign against the agricultural revolution. 
Most of the evidence that the riots were connected to the general idea of 
Swing, if not directly to the disturbances in the south, came from the prosecution 
witnesses at the assize trial. Yet these deponents’ testimonies are suspect because they 
were either involved with the agents provocateurs or were marked out by the crowd 
as targets. The evidence from James Cully, for example, who fled under warrant after 
calling out ‘Jack Swing’ during the riot, came from the informant William 
Huntington, and therefore cannot be verified.84 Christopher Johnson Spencer, an 
upholsterer, stated that he heard a man in the crowd cry, ‘It is the Swing System and it 
is to burn’. However, when Spencer attempted to help put out the fire, he was resisted 
with a shout of ‘Down with the “—“ Upholsterer’.85 It is therefore unclear whether all 
the rioters believed they were taking part in a specifically ‘Swing’ attack or rather, it 
was the authorities and the attacked who made the easy but fearful assumption that the 
incident was connected to the southern disturbances.  
The mythical Swing of the letters was a metonym that, as Peter Jones has 
suggested, although originating from the winding bye–lanes of rural Kent, quickly 
became stretched and spread by ‘the imaginations of newspaper correspondents and 
leader writers’, before filtering into the suspicions of magistrates and landowners and 
‘back into the countryside again’.86 Newspapers played a significant role in fostering 
the myth of Swing and perpetuating rumours in the North. Earlier in the century, 
governments had put pressure on editors not to report arson for fear of encouraging 
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imitative attacks; it is also likely that newspapers did not report minor fires in rural 
areas beyond their reach. But by the early 1830s, certain newspapers fed upon and 
fostered popular interest in Swing.87 
The Whig–leaning Carlisle Journal was relatively neutral in its reporting but 
the Tory Carlisle Patriot, patronized by the Lowthers, was inflammatory. On 4 
December, the Patriot detailed the Swing attacks in the south, ‘spreading with 
frightful rapidity over a large district of country’, before describing the Carlisle arson 
as ‘after the manner of Kent and the other southeastern counties of the kingdom’. The 
narrative of the events of 30 November was headed somewhat sensationally ‘The 
Incendiary System in Carlisle’, thereby conveying an impression of the Swing attacks 
as being connected as a coherent ‘movement’. Within this column, it not only 
reported facts but also gossip, for example, a rumour ‘in general circulation’ at 
Carlisle and Dalston that ‘the corn stacks of William Blamire Esq of Thackwendnook 
are to be fired some of these nights’ owing to suspicions that the magistrate ‘had 
bought up a large quantity of corn and used his influence with the farmers to hold 
back their produce from the markets’.88 Though unproven, this accusation perhaps 
echoed a popular longing for an ideal of moral economy and community justice.  
The sensationalism of the Tory press was mirrored by willingness – if not a 
desire – among the authorities to believe in the myth of Swing for their own purposes 
of defeating the unrest. A key feature of both phenomena of Luddism and Swing was 
that the authorities as well as the protagonists in the action shared in the delusion of 
disparate groups being united under a mythical military leader. The idea of a 
‘movement’ connected by threatening letters, trade unionists, or political radicals, and 
embodied in Captain Swing, was as much a product of the rumour–obsessed 
imaginations or cunning guile of its opponents as of the actions of the crowd or the 
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rather more patchy and unreliable evidence of the anonymous letters.89 It is here that 
emotions came into play over and above objective considerations of structural forces. 
Fear, panic, rumour, and hostility were all core responses that helped to engender 
solidarity among social and political groups and to foster opposition between them.90 
We should not presume that magistrates and other local forces of order, by their 
position against the fervour of the rioting crowd or the ‘mysterious brotherliness’ of 
the Irish immigrants, were entirely rational in their assessment of the situation.91 The 
authorities believed in General Ludd and Captain Swing too, if only as a means of 
providing a convenient excuse for their inability to control the disturbances.92  
The press manipulated deeper emotional impulses among local communities, 
particularly the common fear of the stranger. The newspapers were eager to speculate 
about any unexplained cases of arson. In December 1830, at Barrow, near Barton–
upon–Humber, though the local inhabitants assisted willingly in attempting to 
extinguish the blaze, and though the owner Mr Westonby had ‘received no 
threatening letter as had been reported’, the Wakefield and Halifax Journal surmised 
that his stacks had been fired ‘by a stranger’ because ‘he had a threshing machine on 
his premises’.93 Similarly, in February 1832, a farmer from Fauld, near Longtown, 
eight miles north of Carlisle, suffered arson attacks on stacks on two successive 
nights. The Carlisle Patriot noted that ‘a suspicious looking person, supposed to be a 
man dressed in woman’s clothes, was seen in the neighbourhood shortly before the 
fire was discovered’.94 Magistrates and other officials reported the appearance of 
anonymous letters in tandem with general suspicions about ‘strangers’. These 
imaginings added extra layers to the myth of Swing. In December 1830, Edward 
Donedin, magistrate of Doncaster, reported to Earl Harewood that fourteen 
anonymous threatening letters directed at several prominent individuals had been 
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‘found in the street’ in the township of Crowle. Both Donedin and Harewood believed 
that there was a connection between the letters and the appearance of ‘suspicious 
persons moving about in the neighbourhood seeking for work’. Harewood noted: ‘it is 
stated to me that the arrival of Strangers has always proceeded [sic] acts of outrage’. 
In some cases, even the most respectable of the local notables were prone to panic. 
William Prest of Sherburn near Doncaster wrote to Harewood that he regarded his 
magisterial colleagues’ action of swearing–in of 300 special constables because of a 
‘few foolish letters’ as an absurd product of their collective hysteria.95 
Such suspicions suggest that at times of crisis local elites duped themselves 
into believing rumours propagated by the press: respectable mayors would not have 
reported them for fear of losing credibility. The incendiary, working individually, 
anonymously, and surreptitiously at night, had long been prone to be mythologized as 
a stranger, outside the normal realms of local jurisdiction and observation.96 This 
anxiety reflected the more general fears of magistrates and poor law officials about 
itinerant landless labourers, beggars, and vagrants. In the years preceding the 1834 
new Poor Law, most overseers of the poor regarded vagrancy as representing ‘a full–
blown crisis of labour–discipline’, that is, a nightmare of anonymous and 
uncontrollable bands of migrant workers produced by industrialization and enclosure. 
Such concerns also echoed the fear of strangers engendered by folk tales and oral 
tradition, keenly fostered in areas where parish boundaries were still perambulated 
and common rights to land or work were determined by local custom.97 The 
suspicious stranger was a common bogey–man and a product of frenzied 
imaginations, constructed by magistrates and employers who wanted to portray their 
own inhabitants as ‘loyal’. This brings us back to the community outside the walls of 
Carlisle, where rumour and hostility to strangers combined to produce resistance. 
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After the initial assault upon Benjamin Batty during his first entry into Caldewgate in 
1827, the Carlisle Journal remarked that ‘Old wives’ reports flew about as usual, that 
they had proceeded to rebellion and in short for two hours business was at a stand and 
the town was in complete disarray’.98 While the myth of Swing may have taken a few 
issues of the weekly local paper to foster, therefore, more immediate reactions could 
be commanded by word of mouth and the habitual strength of ‘old wives’ tales’.   
* 
Peter Jones argued that the mythic creation of Captain Swing was ‘less a conscious 
act on the part of agricultural labourers than the result of a symbiotic relationship 
between labourers, cranks, crackpots, Radicals, leader writers, frightened farmers, 
correspondents, and finally the imagination of a public hard–wired in 1830 to find 
Frenchmen, Free Irishmen, and radical agitators hiding behind every haystack and 
lurking down every country lane’.99 To this motley list we must add the authorities 
and local elites. The magistrates and police commission in Carlisle set up an 
incendiary attack in the mode of Swing in order to put down radicalism. But the riots 
of 30 November veered out of their control, beyond the stock narrative of Swing that 
they had determined would be enough to suppress the inhabitants of Caldewgate. Yet 
they, and their colleagues over in Yorkshire, continued to spread of the myth of Swing 
with less deliberate or even conscious intent and in a new direction. Feeding from the 
sensationalism of the Tory newspapers, they produced a scapegoat in order to account 
for their own weaknesses. They hoped for, if not imagined, the existence of Captain 
Swing in order to describe, conceptualize, and comprehend their inability to deal with 
popular unrest within a rapidly changing society and economy. In less feverish times, 
they probably would have realized the absurdity of taking a ‘few foolish letters’ too 
seriously, but with reports of mass incendiarism and machine–breaking in southern 
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England weekly reported in the northern press, they decided not to take the chance to 
dismiss the isolated threats as harmless. Swing was not quite ‘La Grande Peur’ that 
had swept through revolutionary France, but it reflected a more general atmosphere of 
myth–making that took in millenarianism, a belief in a ‘general rising’, and imagined 
leaders in the early nineteenth century.100 
The background to the Carlisle riots in some ways parallels that of the 
southern Swing agitation: a long period of political disaffection, aggravated by 
economic depression and the extraordinary national and international events of 1830. 
The Swing rioters were not solely agricultural labourers: indeed, Roger Wells has 
pointed to ‘journeymen artisans’ leading role in some Swing theatres’.101 Yet there 
were important differences. In the North, incendiarism occurred close to expanding 
urban and industrial areas. In Carlisle, the tensions caused by that expansion created a 
framework for the disturbances. In the West Riding, patterns of suspected arson or 
anonymous letters in some cases echoed the old outlines of Luddite strongholds.102 
Swing did not spread in the same way as they did in the south: that is, disturbances 
did not spread from village to village, fostered by bands of marauding rioters or lone 
itinerants. Rather, newspapers played a prominent role in perpetuating both the idea of 
Captain Swing and a heightened atmosphere of fear. The agitation of the period 1830–
2 would have just been a continuation of older forms of resistance and crime had it 
not been for the willingness of the authorities (indeed more than the perpetrators) to 
employ Captain Swing as an eponym for what they believed to be a much larger 
conspiracy. The incidents in Cumberland and Yorkshire underline the significance of 
emotion and the imagination in both social movements and the actions of those who 
set out to suppress them.103 Swing in the North was a product of rumour as much as of 
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